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Pennsylvania's Common Law Right to Privacy
Inadequately Protects the Rights of Individual
Workers' Compensation Claimants from Harassment
Caused by Video Surveillance
The manifest abuses inherent in a technologically advanced
society and caused by surveillance are self-evident. However, an
individual's interests in privacy must be balanced with the interests
of honest and truthful litigation. Insurance companies and civil
defendants must have a method to protect themselves from
untruthful and fraudulent litigation. Insurance fraud is a distinct
problem in today's insurance intensive society,' and is especially
relevant to workers' compensation proceedings because the
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act requires all employers to
carry insurance. 2 This comment recounts the Pennsylvania common
law right to privacy as well as national developments in common
law privacy rights. Also, this article propounds to suggest a
balanced standard for video surveillance of workers' compensation
claimants, and attempts to weigh the social utility of video
surveillance with an individual's interest in privacy, be it in one's
own home or on the public streets. Finally, this comment will
introduce a balanced standard for future conduction of surveillance
and the admissibility of video surveillance evidence.

I.

THE

TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania recognizes two marked rights to privacy. One is
judicially created, and the other is a by-product of the
commonwealth's Constitution.3 The right to privacy implicated in
1. Experts estimate that insurance fraud costs the insurance industry more than $20
billion each year. Edward L. Schrenk & Johnathan B. Palmquist, Fraudand its Effects on the
Insurance Industry, 64 DEF. CouNs. J. 23, 24 (1997).
2. 77 PA- CONS. STAT. § 501(West 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 106(b)(8) (West 2002).
Failure to issue insurance to employees as statutorily required under the Workers'
Compensation Act is a misdemeanor of the third degree in Pennsylvania.
3. Article I Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution creates a right to privacy to
protect individuals against certain improper acts of government officers. It states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
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the context of video surveillance, where one individual citizen or
legally recognized entity conducts surveillance on another
individual citizen of the Commonwealth, resolves around the
4
judicially created, or common law, right to privacy.
The concept of a legal action emanating from an invasion of
privacy was first expounded by Supreme Court Justices Warren and
Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review over a century ago.5 However,
the appellate courts of Pennsylvania took more than fifty years
after the publication of The Right to Privacy to judicially recognize
a common law right to privacy.6 In Hull v. Curtis Publishing
Company,7 the Pennsylvania Superior Court became the first
appellate court in the state to recognize the existence of the
common law right to privacy. The Hull court cited the language of
Warren and Brandeis, who so influentially wrote that "the right to
privacy is the right to be left alone.""
In Marks v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania,9 19 years
after recognizing the common law right to privacy, the
Pennsylvania courts adopted the Second Restatement of Torts
formulation of invasion of privacy.10 Justice Roberts, speaking for
the supreme court, stated that "the action for invasion of privacy is
actually comprised of four analytically distinct torts: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of name or likeness, (3) publicity
given to private life, and (4) publicity placing a person in false
light.""
Intrusion upon seclusion, one element of invasion of privacy, is
the tort most implicated by video surveillance, and is defined as,
"[tihe intentional intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another, or that person's private affairs or
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
PA- CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
5. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L REv. 193
(1890).
6. Sixty-six years after The Right to Privacy was published did Pennsylvania
recognize a right to privacy in Hull v. Curtis Pub. Co., 125 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956).
7. Hull, 125 A.2d at 644.
8. Id. at 646 (quoting Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 127 P.2d 577, 579 (Cal. App.
1942)).
9. Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 331 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1975).
10. Marks, 331 A-2d at 430. The court effectively adopted RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF
Toms § 625A-J (1977). Id,
11. Id. (quoting from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision Vogel v. W.T Grant Co.,
327 A-2d 133 (Pa. 1974)).
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concerns . .
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
12
person."
reasonable
For an invasion of privacy action, Pennsylvania courts mandate
that "an act must cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a
person of ordinary sensibilities."1 3 To determine if the intrusion
upon seclusion is highly offensive, courts consider the degree of
the intrusion, the context of the intrusion, the conduct surrounding
the intrusion, the actor's motives and .objectives, the setting, and
14
the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.
In Wolfson v. Lewis, the district court, applying Pennsylvania
law, was asked to ascertain whether the conduct of two reporters
deliberately encroached upon parties in a manner that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. 15 The television reporters
invaded upon the seclusion of a health insurer's CEO by "engaging
in a course of conduct apparently designed to hound, harass,
intimidate and frighten."1 6 The court held that evidence presented
at trial, which illustrated that the reporters used "telescopes, zoom
lenses, and ultra sensitive microphones," could reasonably lead a
jury to conclude that the reporters had placed the exterior of the
family's home under surveillance. 17 The reporters' relentless
8
surveillance caused emotional distress to family members.'
Furthermore, the reporters followed the CEO's daughter and
son-in-law to work and attempted to follow them into a building,
and glaringly followed the family to Florida where they went for
the sole purpose of having a secluded vacation.' 9 The reporters also
established a surveillance boat in public waters as close as feasibly
possible to the CEO's home for the "purpose of forcing the CEO to
reconsider his earlier decision not to appear on camera for an
interview regarding allegedly high salaries paid to executives of the
insurer."

20

Intrusion upon seclusion has generally been limited to conduct
which occurs in private places, where a person has an objective
12.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRm §652B (1977).

13. Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct.1985).
14. Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
15. Woifson, 924 E Supp. at 1413.
16. Id. at 1432.
17. Id. at 1422.
18. Id. at 1432.
19. Id. at 1426.
20. Wo~fson, 924 F. Supp. at 1413. See De Angelo v. Fortney, 515 A.2d 594 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1986); Chicarela,494 A.2d at 1109; Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania, 436 A.2d at 701
(Pa. 1981).
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and subjective expectation of privacy. However, in Wolfson, 21 the
federal district court held that "conduct amounting to a persistent
course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable surveillance,
even if conducted in a public or semi-public place, may rise to the
level of an invasion of privacy through an intrusion upon
seclusion."22 In its decision applying Pennsylvania law, the court
affirmed that the tort of invasion of privacy does not normally
apply to events in public places, and quoted from the Restatement
Second of Torts, which propounded a specific exception to the
general rule that an invasion of privacy cannot exist in a public
place. 23 The court declared that "[e]ven in a public place, however,
there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his
underwear or the lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is
24
intrusion upon these matters."
Further, the Pennsylvania courts have refused to create an
independent tort of harassment to cover situations, such as
persistent surveillance, not covered by the recognized torts related
to invasion of privacy. In De Angelo v. Fortney,25 the superior court
rejected adopting harassment as a common law tort, stating, "[w]e
decline to do so in the instant case, being of the opinion that an
action for invasion of privacy will ordinarily be an adequate remedy
for highly offensive conduct which unreasonably interferes with
another's right to be left alone."26 This comment proposes that if
Pennsylvania did recognize a tort of harassment, the necessity of
expanding the common law tort of invasion of privacy would not
be needed in the surveillance context.

II. CIRCUMSCRIBING THE RIGHT To

PRIVACY

BY

FILING Surr

The common law right to privacy is not absolute in any context,
21. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. See also James W. Hilliard, A
Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois: The Unreasonable Intrusion on Another's
Seclusion, 30 LoY. U. CH. LJ. 601, 625 (1999).
22. Wolfson, 924 F Supp. at 1413.
23. The exception is depicted in illustration 7 of §652B Restatement Second of Torts:
A, a young woman, attends a "Fun House," a public place of amusement where
various tricks are played upon visitors. While she is there a concealed jet of
compressed air blows her skirts over her head, and reveals her underwear. B takes a
photograph of her in that position. B has invaded As privacy.
REsrATEmENT (SECOND) TomS Illus. 7 §652B (1977).
24. Wofson, 924 FSupp. at 1421. (quoting RFsrATEmF.NT (SECOND) Tom cmt. c § 652B).
25. De Angelo, 515 A.2d at 594.
26. Id. at 596.
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but is especially limited where a plaintiff initiates a suit for
injuries. 27 The Pennsylvania courts have chosen to apply the
so-called "public figure" limitation to those who make a claim for
personal injuries. 28 In doing so, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has ruled that, "by making a claim for personal injuries [one] must
expect reasonable inquiry and investigation to be made of [their]
claim and to this extent [their] interest in privacy is
circumscribed."29
The Pennsylvania legislature impacted individuals' privacy rights
by passing a law allowing private investigators to practice within
the commonwealth. In 1953, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the
Private Detective Act of 1953 authorizing the use of a licensed
detective to carry out certain surveillance activities. °
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Forster v.
Manchester1 was the first to hold that investigations into the
validity of personal injury claims are in the "best interest of
society," and the "following of a subject during his or her daily
activities and recording on film, movements and whereabouts of a
subject" are consistent with the wording of the Private Detective
Act and its purpose of exposing fabricated claims.3 2 The Workers'
Compensation Act of Pennsylvania sets forth its own set of rules
for the admissibility of video surveillance evidence. Although
surveillance films alone cannot sustain the evidentiary burden of
showing that a workers' compensation claimant's disability has
been diminished, the ramifications of gathering the surveillance
film itself is the crux of the issue.33
27. Moses, 549 A-2d at 950.
28. "Although, the so-called 'public figure' limitation upon the right to privacy has
generally been applied to such persons as actors, public officials, and other news worthy
persons, its rationale also applies to a person who makes a claim for personal injuries."
Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 149 (Pa 1963).
29. Forster, 189 A.2d at 149.
30. 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 12 (West 2002). The pertinent sections of the Private Detective
Act implicated in the workers' compensation claims are sections 12b(2) and 12b(3). Section
12b(2) allows for observation of "[t]he identity, habits, conduct, movements, whereabouts,
affiliations, associations, transactions, reputation, or character, of any person, group of
persons, associations, organization, society, other groups or persons, partnership, or
corporation." 22 PA. CoNs. STAT. §12(b)(2). Section 12(b)3 relates to the credibility of
witnesses. Id.
31. Forster,189 A.2d at 147.
32. Id. at 151.
33. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. WCAB (McClave), 565 A-2d 204 (Pa. Commw. 1989).
Surveillance films alone are inadequate to sustain the evidentiary burden of showing that the
claimant's disability has been reduced. McClave, 565 A.2d at 204. This effectively limits
surveillance films in workers' compensation cases to credibility decisions.
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In Forster, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that the
plaintiffs privacy rights were not violated by a private detective
agency engaged in the investigation of her personal injury claim. 34
Isobel Forster, the plaintiff, was involved in an automobile accident
with Francis Martin. 35 Following the accident, Martin's insurer,
Guardian Mutual Insurance Company, and the adjuster, Hays
Adjustment Bureau, decided to hire a private investigator to
36
observe Mrs. Forster.
Surveillance of Mrs. Forster began on September 15, 1960
and lasted from early in the morning until 5:30 p.m.3 7 The
investigators conducted surveillance of the vicinity where Mrs.
Forster resided, and followed her using two separate automobiles,
keeping in contact with each other via two-way radios.3s The
investigators logged all of the places where Mrs. Forster went, and
on one occasion, while following behind Mrs. Forster at a distance
of one block, the investigators suddenly lost sight of her only to
realize that their car was directly beside hers.3 9 Recognizing one
investigator, Mrs. Forster attempted to evade him in traffic. 4° Later
that same day, Mrs. Forster again passed the investigators and was
frightened by their persistent conduct; in fact, Mrs. Forster became
so extremely nervous and upset as a result of the investigators'
conduct that she encountered hallucinations and frequent
nightmares which necessitated medical treatment.4' To prevent
further surveillance, Mrs. Forster's attorney contacted the chief
investigator by letter explaining the anguish that Mrs. Forster was
experiencing from the surveillance.4 2 However, the request was
ignored, and the investigators continued to observe Mrs. Forster on
at least four separate occasions, even after notification of the
damage the surveillance was causing her.43 Unsympathetic to Mrs.
Forster's plight, the supreme court held that "[tihere was nothing
unreasonable in the manner in which appellant was followed nor in
the taking of motion pictures. In regard to surveillance, it was
conducted by experienced investigators who did not use improper
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Forster,189 A.2d at 152.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Forster,189 A2d at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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techniques."" Additionally, the majority noted that the chief
investigator did not possess the necessary intent or
"outrageousness" of conduct necessary for the plaintiff to recover
for an invasion of privacy."
Conversely, Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. v.
Stevens" exemplifies the dangers of invading one's right to privacy,
which can be caused by abusing surveillance rights.47 Ruth Stevens,
injured in an automobile collision with an individual named Bell,
who was insured by United Services Automobile Association, sued
the insured and a detective agency for damages resulting from
intentional invasion of her privacy rights.4 Mrs. Stevens suffered
physical injury and severe shock to her nervous and emotional
systems after the insurance company, through its attorney,
employed the Pinkerton National Detective Agency to follow Mrs.
Stevens and report on her activities in an effort to determine the
extent of her injury.49 Mrs. Stevens was placed under "constant
surveillance": detectives peeped through her hedges; slinked around
her house; snooped and eavesdropped on her activities; parked
near her house; and followed her at a distance of only a few car
lengths, from morning until late at night.W0 The plaintiff, already
upset as a result of her accident, experienced a continuous feeling
of being spied upon, and, as a result, suffered from extreme mental
torment in the belief that she was "losing her mind."5' The
defendant's surveillance continued even after Mrs. Stevens' attorney
informed the defendant about the mental anguish the surveillance
had been causing.52 Consequently, the court held that the
surveillance was carried out in a way calculated to frighten and
torment Mrs. Stevens, and was not designed to obtain information
44. Forster, 189 A.2d at 150.
45. Id. at 152. As an example, the Restatement of Torts § 46 gives an illustration:
As a practical joke, A falsely tells B that he has read in the paper that her son, C, who
is a paratrooper in a division known to be then participating in an invasion of enemy
territory in wartime, has been reported killed in action. B grieves over the supposed
death of C. A is liable for the grief which he causes her.
RESTATEMENT OF TowTs §46 illus. I (Supp. 1948).
46. 132 S.E. 2d 119 (Ga. App. 1963).
47. The Pinkerton Detective Agency's treachery is not new to the workers of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, especially those of Irish descent living in the Anthracite
coal region of North Eastern Pennsylvania in the 1870's. See KEviN KENNY, MAKING SENSE OF
THE MoiiY MAGu1mS (Oxford University Press 1998).
48. Pinkerton, 132 S.E. 2d at 121.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 123.
51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 165.
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for the defense of plaintiffs lawsuit.5
Besides Pennsylvania, courts of other jurisdictions have
circumscribed a person's right to privacy, placing limitations on
where a violation of individuals right to privacy can take place. For
example, in Figured v. Paralegal Technical Services, Inc., a New
Jersey case, two investigators were assigned to investigate the
extent of a plaintiff's injury. 4 The investigators repeatedly drove in
front of the plaintiffs home, watched her from the roadway,
followed her while she drove to the local store, and parked in a
parking lot to observe her.55 The investigators even went as far as
to follow the plaintiff on a 40-mile jaunt down a highway and into a
rest area to conduct observation.56 The New Jersey Superior Court
held that the investigators' conduct was not capable of producing
"mental. distress . . . so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it."57 Furthermore, the court explained that the
plaintiff's invasion of privacy claim must fail because the
investigators only observed the plaintiff in public, and "whatever
the public can see from a public place cannot be private."M Thus,
those who are in public view cannot recovery for the invasion of
privacy. In essence, the courts are adopting a view that a person
has no right to privacy when venturing into the public realm.
1H.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION DECISIONS

Workers' compensation decisions involving surveillance are
somewhat different from cases involving the tort of invasion of
privacy because they concern the ability to recover workers'
compensation benefits, and not damages in tort. Three workers'
compensation decisions, two from California and one from
Alabama, though they have inapposite results, help express the
plight of the injured worker. These cases are Redner v. Workman's
Compensation Appeals Board,5 Unrah v. Truck Insurance
61
Exchange,6° and Johnson v. Corporate Special Services, Inc.
Redner and Unrah are examples of inappropriate surveillance and
53.
54.
55.

Pinkerton, 132 S.E.2d at 124.
555 A.2d 663 (N.J. Super. 1989).
Figured, 555 A.2d at 664.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 665.

58.

Id. at 667.

59.
60.
61.

485 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1971).
498 P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1972).
602 So. 2d 385 (Ala 1992).
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investigator conduct, whereas Johnson remains an example of
"reasonable" surveillance of a workers' compensation claimant.
In Redner, two workers' compensation claim investigators
induced the claimant to become intoxicated and ride a horse, and
filmed the scene from a secluded location.6 2 The Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board, after relying entirely on the tape,
issued an opinion that the claimant was not disabled.63 However,
the California Supreme Court ruled that the videotape should have
been excluded from the claim proceedings because of the improper
conduct of the investigators in gathering the evidence.64 The court
stated that claim investigations must be conducted within "legal
bounds.'65
Unrah represents a rather unusual example of the conduct that
investigators are willing to engage in to put a workers'
compensation claimant under surveillance. In investigating the back
injury of the claimant, one of the investigators befriended the
claimant to "misrepresent his capacity and his intentions toward
the plaintiff."6 The investigator, after cultivating a "relationship"
with the claimant, took her to Disneyland where one investigator
enticed her to perform activities above and beyond her limitations
while the other investigator filmed the events.67 "Upon learning of
'the ruse and deception' practiced on her by defendants, plaintiff
suffered a physical and mental breakdown requiring
hospitalization."68 The case was remanded for trial on the merits of
the claim for invasion of privacy. 9
In Johnson, the Alabama court reached an inapposite decision to
the California courts' holdings in Unruh and Redner, evidencing
that courts treat workers' compensation claimants' -invasion of
privacy claims differently across the nation. The Alabama Supreme
Court, in Johnson, upheld summary judgment against a workers'
compensation claimant who alleged his privacy was usurped by the
conduct of insurance investigators. 0 The claimant, Billy Johnson,
62. Redner, 485 P.2d at 803.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 804.
65. Id. at 807.
66. Unruh, 498 P.2d at 1066. The investigator pretended to be the claimant's
"boyfriend." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1067.
69. Id. at 1079.
70. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 388; See also Andrew D. Morton, Much Ado About
Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law Enforcement, and the Law of the Unintended
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was injured after falling at work.7 ' His employer was insured for
workman's cotipensation claims by St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company, which hired Corporate Special Services, Inc.,
to investigate the validity of Johnson's disability claim.72 The
investigator parked outside of the claimant's house to observe him,
but did not "attempt to observe him inside of his house."73 During
the surveillance of Johnson, the investigator was approached by the
local police, and after explaining the situation to the officers,
changed his location to the driveway facing Mr. Johnson's
residence. 74 Johnson then noticed the investigator and blocked the
investigator in the driveway with his car.75 After showing Mr.
Johnson that he was carrying a firearm, the investigator was
allowed to leave the scene.7 6 The Alabama Supreme Court declared
"that because Johnson's activities in his front yard could have been
observed by any passerby, Corporate's intrusion into Johnson's
77
privacy was not 'wrongful' and, therefore, was not actionable."
Therefore, Johnson's privacy was not invaded, and summary
judgment was properly granted in the case. 78
IV.

RECOGNITION OF A PUBLIC RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The inherent difficulty with litigating a violation of an individual's
right to privacy in the workers' compensation context is
complicated by the relevant legal standard applied to conduct
carried out in full public view. In his article about privacy law,
Professor Andrew J. McClurg expounds a tort theory of liability
that holds individuals accountable for their actions that invade a
person's privacy, -even if occurring in a "public" place.7 9 Professor
McClurg argues for recognition of a right of "public privacy," and
8
correspondingly "liability for intrusions in public places." 0
In analyzing a possible invasion of privacy, one must first define
public space. Courts have continually defined "public space" to
Consequencesfor Anti-PaparazziLegislation, 147 U. PA. L REV. 1435, 1472 (1999).
71. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 386.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 387.
77. Id. at 388.
78.

Id. at 388.

79. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of The Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability For Intrusions In Public Places, 73 N.C. L REV. 989 (1995).
80.

Id.
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cover "a wide range of locations, from bustling thoroughfares to
remote getaways . . the term generally, includes any place,
whether publicly or privately owned, to which the public has
access."8 ' The judiciary has expanded the definition to include:
anywhere that is visible from a publicly accessible vantage
point, such as parts of the interior of one's home or garden
that are visible from the street. [Public space] may even
include parts of the interior of one's home that can be seen
with the naked eye from a neighboring apartment.8 2
This broad expansion of the definition of public space severely
impairs one's privacy rights by eliminating surveillance occurring in
public areas from becoming the subject of a tort suit.
Professor McClurg argues against limiting the tort of invasion of
privacy based upon the place of occurrence by refuting the very
foundations of the common law right to privacy. Warren and
Brandeis worried that technological innovations, which were
occurring at a rapid rate during their tenure as Supreme Court
Justices, would interfere with individual's privacy rights.8 3 Similarly,
Professor McClurg argues that the fears of Warren and Brandeis
are ever multiplying, and are of even more concern today than they
were in the late 19th and early 20 th centuries:
If Warren [were] annoyed by the newspaper revelation that the
Warrens 'gave a handsome wedding breakfast after the
ceremony' or the observation that there were 'no bridesmaids'
at the wedding, one can imagine he would be apoplectic
reading and viewing media coverage concerning the private
lives of citizens in modern times.8 4
Additionally, Professor McClurg asserts that "[w]hatever snooping
devices concerned Warren and Brandeis, it is safe to say they are
to modem surveillance technology what the slide rule is to the
personal computer."8 5 Certainly Warren and Brandeis would be
alarmed by today's sophisticated surveillance devices such as "night
81. Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the ReasonableParanoid: The Protection of
Privacy In Public Places, 50 U. ToRoNTo LJ. 305 (2000) (quoting Batts v. City of Baton
Rouge, 501 So. 2d 302 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1986)).
82. Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981) (ruling that no actionable claim
for an invasion of privacy existed where a pharmacist was filmed inpide his pharmacy after
opening hours from an adjoining driveway).
83. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
84. McClurg, supra note 79, at 1008.
85. Id. at 1017.
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vision optics" and other surveillance devices, which are easily
attainable by any member of the public.86 These types of
surveillance devices further enable the ability to intrude clearly
beyond what should be permissible by law.
The courts, by limiting the tort of invasion into seclusion and the
right of privacy in public places, have severely curtailed the rights
of a workers' compensation claimant to sue for harassing
surveillance. By virtually eliminating a claimant's right to privacy in
a public place and by not adopting a tort of harassment,
Pennsylvania has severely repressed litigation against workers'
compensation insurance carriers by removing the last impediments
87
to stop the insurers from conducting harassing surveillance.
However, at least in dicta, Pennsylvania courts have seemingly
mentioned that a right to privacy exists, even in public places,
which is consistent with Professor McClurg's views. 88
Professor McClurg asserts that the "unanimous acceptance" of
the rule that no violation of privacy can occur in a place
considered to be "public" stems from the writings of Dean Prosser,
an authority on tort law.m Two basic premises gave rise to Prosser's
view that there cannot be any invasion of privacy if in a public
place: (1) assumption of the risk by placing oneself in view of the
public; and (2) there is no difference between observing a person
in public and taking their photograph 90
The first principle is entirely relevant to videotaping workers'
compensation claimants because the claimant has not only
assumed a risk by going into public view, but also has
circumscribed the right to privacy by filing a claim for a
work-related injury 9' Professor McClurg discusses the foundation
behind Prosser's rationale for rejecting the existence of a right to
privacy in a public place to be that individuals -naturally risk
exposure by venturing out from their "private sanctuaries."9 Dean
Prosser relied on the decision of Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.9 3 to
support this view.9 4 In Gill, the California Supreme Court held that
86. An example of a website where these surveillance devices can be purchased by
members of the general public is http://www.ittuv.com (last visited February 5, 2002).
87. See supra notes 3-58 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. McClurg, supra note 79, at 1036.
90. Id. at 1032 (citing to William L Prosser, Privacy, 48 CA. L REv. 383 (1960)).
91. Moses, 549 A-2d at 950.
92. McClurg, supra note 79, at 1036.
93. 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
94. McClurg, supra note 79, at 1037.
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the "mere publication of [a] photograph standing alone does not
constitute an actionable invasion of privacy."9 5
The Gill case arose over a newspaper photographer taking a
picture of a couple, sitting and eating ice cream, at a public
confectionary. 96 The man was sitting close to the woman with his
arm around her in a "romantic pose."97 This photo had no news
value, and was taken for only entertainment purposes. 98 It is
McClurg's contention that Dean Prosser adopted the Gill
assumption of the risk analysis when he stated that "[o]n the public
street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no right to be
alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than
follow him about."99 Professor McClurg argues persuasively that the
court's opinion is based in terms of assumption of the risk, which
should not have been applied in this context. 1°° The court held that
the plaintiffs' privacy was not invaded because they were in "a
pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place," and "had
voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the
view of any persons who might then be at or near their place of
business." 10 1 Professor McClurg argues that the assumption of the
risk analysis is inapplicable because the plaintiffs in Gill did not
have "knowledge of the risk in any meaningful sense;" more
importantly, "it surely cannot be said that the Gill plaintiffs
voluntarily consented to the risk of the defendant taking their
photograph, much less publishing it in a national magazine." 1°2
Disagreeing with Prosser, McClurg further asserts:
There is nothing 'voluntary' about assuming a public pose
except in the most trivial sense. Under the Gill rationale, the
only way one may avoid 'voluntarily' exposing herself to
unwarranted scrutiny would be not to hold a job, go to the
grocery store, obtain medical help, take children to school,
seek outdoor recreation, etc.' 03
As to Dean Prosser's second assumption, Professor McClurg
95. Gill, 253 P.2d at 443.
96. Id. at 442.
97. Id. at 444-45.
98. Id. at 444.
99. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON El"AL,
(5th ed 1984)).
100. McClurg, supra note 77, at 1038.
101. Gill, 253 P.2d at 444.
102. McClurg, supra note 77, at 1040.
103. Id.

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

ToRTS 391

536

Vol. 40:523

Duquesne Law Review

refutes the assertion that observing someone in public with the
naked eye and taking the individual's photograph, or more
pertinent, a video, is one and the same.1°4 McClurg avers that
photographic evidence differs from what is seen by the "naked eye"
in three significant ways. Furthermore, McClurg offers that the
three differences actually intensify the invasion of privacy when a
photographic device is used.'0 5 The three differences are: (1)
temporal limitations; (2) permanency of the record; and (3) the
possibility of dissemination of the image. 1°6
First, photographic evidence intensified because, '"the temporal
limitations that are otherwise inherent in public intrusions are
extended
intrusive
scrutiny to
be
eliminated'
allowing
10
v
Secondly, McClurg asserts that because of the
indefinitely."
"permanency" of the record, things can be seen in the "photograph"
that would not otherwise have been readily observable with the
naked eye. l 08 Lastly, the ability of photographic evidence to be
widely disseminated intensifies the invasion of one's privacy via
photographic or videotaping surveillance. Explaining, McClurg
maintains that "[clonduct which would be appropriate for one
environment may be inappropriate and embarrassing in another." 9
The three intensifiers identified by Professor McClurg in his article
clearly illustrate why photographic evidence obtained in a public
place is a more severe intrusion into one's privacy than observation
by the naked eye.

V. DECISIONS

IMPLICTLY RECOGNIZING

A PuBuc

RIGHT

To

PRIVACY

Professor McClurg's article recognizes that various courts have
104. Prosser stated- "Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a
place, since this amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially
from a full written description, of a public sight which any one present would be free to
see." Prosser, supra note 88, at 383.
105. McClurg, supra note 77, at 1043.
106. Id. at 1043-44.
107. Id. at 1041-42.
108. Professor McClurg cited to McNamara v. Freedom Newspaper Inc., 802 S.W. 2d
901 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991), to explain his second intensifier of permanency. In
McNamara, a photograph, taken during a high school soccer game, showed the plaintiffs
gentalia to be exposed at the moment the photograph was taken. McNamara, 802 S.W. 2d at
902. The plaintiffs action was dismissed because the court held that the plaintiff
"voluntarily" exposed himself to public view by participating in the soccer match. Id. at 905.
109. McClurg explains: "For example, although many persons are willing to expose
their flesh at the beach or poolside, most would not willingly expose the same image to
other audiences or in other contexts." McClurg, supra note 77, at 1043.
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implicitly recognized a public right to privacy."0 For example, in
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, the Supreme Court of Alabama
became the first court to implicitly recognize that a right to privacy
exists even in "public.""' In Daily Times Democrat, a newspaper
published a picture showing the plaintiff with her dress blown up
as she was leaving a fun house at a county fair.12 Siding with the
plaintiff, the court held that "[t]o hold that one who is involuntarily
and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her
right of privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be
3
part of a public scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust.""1
Probably the most famous example of a court recognizing an
implicit right to privacy in public is Galella v. Onassis, a case
involving the wife of late President John F. Kennedy.1 4 Galella
seemingly exemplifies a case-by-case exception to the rule that no
right to privacy exists in public. The court granted injunctive relief
against a photographer who went far beyond the reasonable
bounds of news-gathering."15 "[Clonduct that amounts to a
persistent course of hounding, harassment and unreasonable
surveillance, even if conducted in a public or semi public place"
was held to invade one's right to privacy. 1 6 The court declared that
"legitimate countervailing social needs may warrant some intrusion
despite an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and
freedom from harassment. However the inference allowed may be
no greater than that necessary to protect the overriding public
interest.""17 This recognition of a public right to privacy has not
been extended beyond the specific facts of Galella. The case could
be analyzed as one involving the desire to protect a beloved
member of American society. Regardless, the public right to privacy
has not been extended to workers' compensation client's in claim
investigations.

VI. A

BALANCED STANDARD FOR SURVEILLANCE

The aforementioned case law establishes one overriding concept:
110. Id. at 1044. Professor McClurg cites and discusses several judicial decisions that
indirectly recognize a public right to privacy, including Daily Times Democrat v. Graham
and GaleUa v. Onassis, discussed infra.
111. 162 So. 2d. 474 (Ala. 1964).
112. Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 475.
113. Id. at 478.
114. Gaie//a v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2nd Cir. 1973).
115. Galella, 487 F 2d at 990.
116. Wolfson, 924 F Supp. at 1420.
117. Gale/la, 487 F2d at 995.
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there is a definite need to balance the social utility of surveillance
with workers' compensation claimant's interest in privacy while in
his home or even in the public forum. The boundaries between
clearly public and clearly private behaviors are becoming
continually blurred in today's high-tech society because
increasingly, individuals are choosing to work from their homes or
unconventional places of business. For instance, to start an internet
company, all one needs is a basic computer set-up and some
general knowledge of the internet. Therefore, to prevent further
erosion of the concept of privacy, Pennsylvania courts must act to
protect an individual's privacy interest, and avoid making artificial
distinctions, such as the location of the alleged incidence, in
deciding whether a tort has occurred. The current system of
common law court decisions sets forth a standard by which the
same conduct may or may not be a violation of privacy, depending
on the location of the alleged incident. Locality is an immaterial
distinction because an individual's freedom from invasion of
privacy, wherever it may occur, must be protected; thus, the
locality rule should be summarily discarded by the Pennsylvania
courts.
Although there is a need to protect honest and fruitful litigation,
unlimited surveillance is clearly not the answer. The three
intensifiers that Professor McClurg discussed in his article reveal
the difference between observing an incident with the "naked eye"
and the result of observing the incident via surveillance.118 Because
of the forseeability of its misuse, surveillance methods need to be
limited. Although the investigation of workers' compensation claims
does not always involve the commission of a tort, such as the
invasion of privacy, the worker's right to privacy is impacted.
A workers' compensation claimant cannot reasonably be said to
have voluntarily placed himself in the public spotlight by filing a
claim for benefits. The workers' compensation claimant did not
voluntarily allow himself to be injured at work. In fact, under
current law, the injured claimant, by simply filing a claim in the
hopes of becoming "whole" again, "must expect reasonable inquiry
and investigation to be made of [his] claim and to this extent [his]
interest in privacy is circumscribed."11 9 An individual must expect
some type of reasonable inquiry, but it is the danger inherent in
that inquiry that needs to be circumscribed. Currently, the workers'
118. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
119. Forster, 189 A.2d at 149.
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compensation claimant almost entirely loses his right to privacy in
a public place when he files a claim for benefits. Safeguards are
necessary to prevent this injustice.
First, videotape evidence, like that gathered by private
investigation agencies and insurance companies in worker's
compensation cases, is recorded without temporal limitations. 120
These limitations are necessary for a workers' compensation judge
to properly consider and interpret the evidence. Due to the relaxed
nature of workers' compensation proceedings, compared to those
in state trial court proceedings, a workers' compensation judge is
required to use the surveillance video to determine the credibility
of the claimant, which either supports or undermines the
opinion(s) of testifying physicians. As a result, the judge's decision
is based primarily on his own opinions on the validity and
importance of the surveillance evidence. Videos presented in this
context, or out of context, as one should say, are wholly unreliable
because they are not understood in the context of the daily life of
the claimant; therefore, the use of such videotapes should be
severely limited. Without the proper expert testimony to explain the
nature of physical motions and movements and interpret the films,
videotapes are relatively of little use and should not be. admitted
into evidence.
Second, the permanency of videotapes and their ability to be
widely disseminated cause inherent difficulties for a claimant trying
to recover workers' compensation. 12 1 Video surveillance technology
allows a film of the claimant to be slowed down to observe
behaviors or objects that the human eye cannot clearly see upon
normal observation. Thus, a permanency in the record is created,
by which insurers and private investigators can closely examine the
videotapes for any inaccuracies that might exist. Additionally, the
permanency of these records creates a further need for expert
testimony in conjunction with the use of these videos.
Although workers' compensation videos are not widely
disseminated, the ability of these videotapes to fall into the wrong
hands is clearly evident. For example, a private investigator is not
the only individual viewing such tapes - everyone in his office, the
videographer, and the individuals working for the insurance
120. McClurg, supra note 79, at 104142. The first "intensifier" discussed by Professor
McClurg was temporal limitations, or context Professor McClurg argued that video evidence
is only a "snap shot" view of the situation and is taken out of context, which is necessary for
proper interpretation. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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company all may see the videotape. Therefore, the use of these
videos must be carefully scrutinized and limited by the courts of
Pennsylvania.
Professor McClurg's three intensifiers clearly illustrate that video
surveillance evidence must be limited in court proceedings.
Because the courts are highly unlikely to adopt a tort theory of
public intrusion into privacy, at least they can limit the use of
surveillance in the context of litigation, or effect further safeguards
that will adequately protect the workers of Pennsylvania. Even in
informal hearings, such as workers' compensation proceedings, the
use of surveillance videos must be limited in order to protect the
privacy interests of the claimant.
One alternative to using surveillance videotape is for an insurer
or private investigator to testify before a workers' compensation
judge as to the claimant's conduct that was openly observed.
However, these investigators are at best qualified private detectives,
not medical experts specially trained in the mechanics of the
human body and its relation to physical injury; therefore, they
could not testify as to the claimant's physical ability to perform
certain activities. A complete ban on video evidence and an
adoption of a "live" testimony standard would entirely eliminate the
three intensifiers recognized by Professor McClurg in his article. As
a result, workers' compensation claimants' privacy interests will be
protected, as will the defendant insurance companies' interests in
fair and truthful litigation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

To create a standard for video evidence in workers'
compensation is an almost impossible task. Establishing this
standard in one articulable and definite test for ascertaining
whether, and under what circumstances a violation of a person's
right to privacy has taken place, is nearly impossible. The
determination of when and what constitutes a violation of the right
to privacy is entirely a fact-based inquiry, which changes depending
on the morals and political nature of society as a whole.
Additionally, in privacy law, more than any other aspect of the law,
individuals have vastly differing opinions as to whether a violation
of "privacy rights" has occurred. One individual may totally accept
the given conduct of a private investigator, while someone else in
the same situation could feel entirely violated by the investigators
conduct. These varied expectations of people, which are, all
arguably reasonable, give the reader just a glimpse of some of the

2002

Pennsylvania's Common Law Right to Privacy

541

difficulties judges experience in setting a standard to protect
privacy interests.
Brian Patrick Bronson

